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The Role of Levies in Canada’s Digital Music Marketplace
Jeremy F. deBeer†

Introduction

other convergence devices onto which music may be
copied. The government is now studying the issue and
has promised public consultations in the very near
future.
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usic has been called a ‘‘canary in the digital
coalmine’’ 1 because the fate of the music industry
foreshadows that of the book publishing, movie, television, software and video game sector. 2 Each of these
creative industries is concerned about sustainability in
the face of change, although the music industry has been
the most talked about lately. The technological, economic, cultural and social environment in which all
music creators work is much different than it was even a
short while ago. There is increasing pressure, therefore, to
revise Canada’s copyright laws to address numerous perceived problems.

Another example of a scheme targeting third parties
rather than music consumers directly is ‘‘Tariff 22’’,
which had proposed to charge Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) for royalties in respect of music hosted on or
telecommunicated via their networks. After the Supreme
Court of Canada ruled that ISPs are generally not liable
to pay such a tariff, 5 it was refiled to target Web sites
rather than intermediaries. Nevertheless, some commentators in Canada and the United States have suggested
that a levy on Internet access should be implemented as
a substitute for traditional copyright laws in the online
environment. 6

One of the topics being discussed by courts, commentators and government policymakers is the role of
levies, as opposed to traditional copyrights or other alternatives, as a solution to the challenges of the digital
music marketplace. 3 The Canadian music industry has
traditionally built business models upon the exchange of
proprietary copyrights in free markets, sometimes made
more efficient through collective administration. Simultaneously, the industry has benefited from a variety of
public funding programs designed to financially support
specific parties or activities. Recently in Canada, new
schemes have emerged or been proposed whereby the
music industry collects remuneration from third parties
not directly involved in the use of copyright-protected
music.

This paper considers whether such initiatives are a
desirable alternative to the current system of exclusive
proprietary copyrights. My goal is not to evaluate the
nuances of any particular levy scheme or proposal, but to
consider the implications of the concept from a specifically Canadian perspective. Despite the generality of the
analysis, many of the observations and conclusions about
the viability of levy schemes relate to Canada’s actual
experiences with its existing private copying levy.
The paper concludes that tariffs or levies on the
products and services of third parties are not the best
method to support the Canadian music industry in the
digital environment. A new levy should not be imposed
on iPods, digital memory cards, computer hard drives,
other digital devices, nor should there be a levy applied
to Internet access. Indeed, Canada’s existing private copying levy should be eliminated or substantially overhauled.

One example is Canada’s private copying levy,
which obliges importers of certain blank media to pay
remuneration to some music creators on account of
music copied privately by individual Canadians. The
levy currently applies only to blank audiotapes and compact discs (CDs). The Copyright Board of Canada also
certified a levy on digital audio recorders, such as Apple’s
iPod, although this was overturned on appeal. 4 It is possible that this levy will soon be expanded to encompass
iPods and similar digital music devices, solid-state removable digital memory products like CompactFlash cards,
hard disc drives in desktop and laptop computers,
and/or mobile phones, personal digital assistants and

In the long term, the whole idea of exclusive copyrights will probably require some fundamental
rethinking, and the shape of the music industry might be
very different from the one we know now. Forwardthinking commentators who have advocated for revolutionary alternatives to the copyright system have there-
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fore made a valuable contribution to the debate about
the future of digital music and entertainment.
In the near term, however, proposals for radical
reform will likely lead to compromise solutions and halfmeasures, which are neither conceptually justifiable nor
practically workable. It is preferable to tweak the existing
system of proprietary copyrights and free markets by
promoting and streamlining voluntary collective
licensing models. These must be supplemented with
stable and generous funding programs targeted directly
at Canadian artists and music consumers.

Copyright Markets
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o properly evaluate contemporary challenges, one
must begin by acknowledging the complex structure of the music industry. The creation of music, like
other cultural products, is a team sport. 7 The process
originates with lyricists and composers, the authors of
musical works. Performers interpret authors’ works
through their performances. Producers (‘‘ sound
recording makers’’ 8) transform performers’ performances
of authors’ works into mass-marketable commodities,
like CDs or downloadable digital files. Music was typically distributed either through retailers or broadcasters.
In today’s marketplace, however, ‘‘weightless’’ 9 products
are being distributed through digital music stores, satellite transmissions, Webcasts, and various other means. 10
The marketing chain used to end with music consumers,
but that is also changing. Consumers themselves are
often authors and performers, and they increasingly act
as producers and distributors of original or re-mixed
music as well. Any viable option for reform must therefore address the concerns of all parties, including consumers.
Traditional business models in the music industry
depend on copyrights and related rights — exclusive
legal rights to do certain acts in respect of music. These
include most importantly the rights to reproduce and
perform (or telecommunicate) music, and the right to
authorize reproductions and performances (or telecommunications) of music. 11 Revenue streams are generated
by voluntarily exchanging these rights for royalty or
licence payments in free markets.
Copyright markets are, of course, artificially created.
Music is not naturally rivalrous, excludable or exhaustible, meaning all Canadians can simultaneously sing the
same song at the same time without doing the song itself
any true harm. This is different from ‘‘classic’’ 12 private
property, where one person’s use precludes another’s and
there is a finite supply of goods available. In the music
industry, copyright law creates artificial scarcity in order
to drive market transactions.
Sometimes, the copyright market can fail. This
might happen where the enforcement of exclusive rights
is impractical because, for example, there are many
potential licensees and the cost of licensing each out-
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weighs the revenue that would be earned. The phenomenon of copying music for private non-commercial use
was believed to be an example of such a situation.
Enforcement is also difficult where the law is disconnected from the social norms that govern people’s behaviour. 13 It is tough to enforce laws that people do not
believe in. Peer-to-peer file sharing is an example.
Sometimes, copyright enforcement is not impractical, but is otherwise objectionable. For example, there
may be privacy or liberty concerns about monitoring
private activities. This was apparently the impetus for
world’s first levy scheme, introduced in Germany in
1965. 14 Such concerns were also debated in the recent
case of BMG v. Doe, 15 where the Federal Court of Appeal
held:
Citizens legitimately worry about encroachment upon their
privacy rights. The potential for unwarranted intrusion into
individual personal lives is now unparalleled. In an era
where people perform many tasks over the Internet, it is
possible to learn where one works, resides or shops, his or
her financial information, the publications one reads and
subscribes to and even specific newspaper articles he or she
has browsed. This intrusion not only puts individuals at
great personal risk but also subjects their views and beliefs to
untenable scrutiny. 16

Ultimately, the Court’s decision was to allow future copyright plaintiffs to obtain a court order, in certain circumstances, which would compel service providers to
disclose their customers’ identities. Both the trial and
appellate decisions demonstrate, however, that courts do
recognize privacy objections to copyright enforcement
and monitoring tactics.
Another objection is that copyright markets are inefficient. Copyright law is structured to make it difficult
for users of cultural products to bargain for the rights
they need and want — for example, the ability to use
‘‘music’’, rather than a separate work, performance,
recording and broadcast, and the separate rights to
reproduce and to communicate those things. This fragmentation of copyright into various different rights held
by different entities is a serious impediment to market
exchange. 17 In some cases, there are collective societies or
licensing agencies that simplify the process by eliminating the need to negotiate with an individual party.
However, there are an exceptionally large number of
Canadian copyright collectives, and there is still inadequate co-operation amongst these representatives to facilitate the convenient acquisition of multiple rights from
multiple entities. 18
Copyright markets might also be objectionable
where significant portions of copyright royalties flow to
or through intermediaries. Because lyricists and composers often assign their rights to music publishers, and
performers often assign their rights to record producers, 19 these corporate intermediaries perform a gatekeeping function. Grant and Wood have noted an
alarming trend in the market for cultural goods and
services:
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Five huge record companies control more than 70 per cent
of dollar volume in sound recordings. . . . The concentration
of media is growing apace around the world. It is harder and
harder for ‘‘independent’’ producers to survive, whether in
the United States or in any country where concentration is
increasing. The distribution of cultural products is often in
the hands of gatekeepers who reduce choice rather than
expand it. 20
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In theory, greater revenue for intermediaries means
greater investment in product development, and so the
benefit to grassroots artists is indirect but nevertheless
real. This is true to an extent, but it is questionable policy
to entrust responsibility for the development of Canadian music to foreign-controlled private entities. ‘‘What
will happen is a more commercially oriented cultural
sector offering fairly homogeneous fair for a mass audience and selected quality niches for a rich elite.’’ 21 A
vibrant cultural industry furthers important non-economic values 22 that may be neglected in a mass market
controlled by global gatekeepers. This is especially true
in respect of genuinely Canadian music.
The most recent statistical data (2003) confirms that
foreign-controlled companies dominate the Canadian
music scene with an 85% market share in sales of
recorded music. 23 Professor Geist has commented in
detail on Canada’s ‘‘cultural deficit’’. 24 To be clear, the
deficit Canada suffers is really in the exchange with the
United States. In the year 2002 Canada’s deficit in culture services trade with the United States stood at almost
$1.2 billion, while trade with the rest of the world
amounted to a roughly $250 million surplus. 25 A quick
look at the significance of copyright royalty payments to
Canada’s cultural deficit with the United States may be a
good indication of the effect of recent copyright reforms.
Between 1996 and 2002, Canada’s deficit with the
United States in copyright royalty payments more than
doubled. 26 At the same time, our deficit in trade-mark
royalty payments increased by about one quarter. 27 If
Canada further amends its copyright legislation to conform to international agreements, changes to the private
copying levy alone could generate ‘‘a substantial increase
in payments from Canadian consumers to foreign performers and makers’’ — further net outflows could be in
the tens of millions of dollars. 28
In sum, the traditional business models built on the
exchange of copyrights in a free market might be deficient in several ways. Arguably, exclusive copyrights are
pragmatically difficult to monitor and enforce. Enforcement may also be objectionable for privacy reasons. Copyright markets might be inefficient, and can lead to a
concentration of revenue and market power in the
hands of foreign corporations at the expense of Canadian artists. In light of these concerns, it is not surprising
that both copyright-holders and consumers sometimes
advocate for levies as a solution, although each group
does so for very different reasons.

Third Party Proxies

I

n cases where it is impractical, objectionable or inefficient to voluntarily exchange or enforce copyrights in
the free market, some countries have introduced levies.
Such levies vary greatly in scope 29 and theory. 30 In
Canada, after more than a decade of lobbying, the music
industry convinced Parliament that private copying onto
blank tapes was causing significant losses. 31 It seems to
have been assumed that a levy was the best way to
address this issue. So, in 1998, Part VIII of the Copyright
Act legalized private copying onto some types of blank
media, and as a corollary, allowed certain rights-holders
to propose a levy payable by manufacturers and
importers of those media. 32
The breadth of Canada’s levy turns on the definition of an ‘‘audio recording medium’’ in section 79. It is
legal to copy privately using ‘‘a recording medium,
regardless of its material form, onto which a sound
recording may be reproduced and that is of a kind ordinarily used by individual consumers for that purpose,
excluding any prescribed kind of recording medium’’.
Certain authors, performers and producers may propose
a levy on the same.
After its first hearings on the matter, the Copyright
Board adopted a flexible and relaxed interpretation of
‘‘ordinarily used’’ in order to ensure that blank CDs, a
relatively new technology at the time, would be captured. It held the standard to mean that media are leviable so long as their use for copying music is ‘‘nonnegligible’’. 33 In effect, according to the Board, ordinarily
means not extraordinarily. The Federal Court of Appeal
affirmed that this view was not ‘‘patently unreasonable’’
but stopped short of holding that the Board’s interpretation was correct. 34
Another key phrase in section 79 is ‘‘regardless of its
material form’’. Following its third hearings on private
copying, the Copyright Board interpreted this to include
digital audio recorders, such as the Apple iPod. 35 The
Federal Court of Appeal, however, reversed the Board’s
decision on this point. The Court of Appeal held that
memory is not a leviable medium if embedded into a
device, and felt the decision to extend the levy to iPods
was for the legislator, not the Board or the courts, to
make. 36
One interpretation of the Court’s decision leaves
open the possibility that removable digital memory, or a
computer hard drive that has not yet been incorporated
into a device, could be subject to a levy in the future. It
may, however, be splitting hairs to call an iPod a device
and removable or raw digital memory a medium. More
importantly, such a medium may not be in a form ‘‘ordinarily used’’ by individuals to copy music. In fact, the
Copyright Board expressly held that products such as
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IBM MicroDrive hard drives or CompactFlash digital
memory cards are overwhelmingly used for digital photography rather than copying music. 37 Given the Board’s
lax interpretation of ‘‘ordinarily used’’ this could change
in a heartbeat. On the other hand, the Federal Court of
Appeal has indicated this issue is more a matter of legislative policy than statutory interpretation or the application of law to fact.
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We may not have to wait for the courts to resolve
the question. The Government has identified Canada’s
private copying regime as a timely issue, and has committed to engage in study and public consultations on
the matter. 38 Among the most pressing questions will be
whether, and if so how, the scheme should apply to
digital devices, memory cards, computer hard drives and
multi-use digital products in general.
Whereas the private copying levy might apply to
digital devices in order to address the private reproduction of digital music by consumers, this is entirely separate from any royalties payable in respect of reproductions of author’s musical works by ‘‘online music
services’’ who supply consumers with digital music. 39
And, in addition to authors’ rights, digital music suppliers must also worry about performers’ and producers’
reproduction rights. These must be cleared individually
through various members of the Canadian Recording
Industry Association (CRIA), 40 or possibly collectively
through different bodies representing music in French
and English. 41 Believe it or not, this simplistic description
of some reproduction rights-clearance issues in respect of
authors, performers and producers only scratches the
surface.
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Court confirmed the Copyright Board’s ruling that ISPs
are not typically liable for telecommunicating, or authorizing the communication of, copyright-protected content. 44 Proposed changes to the Copyright Act in Bill
C-60 would require ISPs to pass notices of alleged
infringement to their customers or face certain penalties.
It would not, however, make ISPs liable for copyright
infringement generally. 45 Therefore, SOCAN has
amended its proposed tariff to target music Web sites,
Webcasts and any other ‘‘site or service accessible via the
Internet or a similar transmission facility from which
content is transmitted to Users’’. 46
So far, no tariff would apply to intermediaries in
their role strictly as intermediaries. But multiple proposed tariffs would apply to intermediaries that are in
any way content providers. Moreover, the idea of a general levy on Internet access is by no means dead. Several
commentators have proposed specifically that Canadian
ISPs should be made legally responsible for providing
remuneration in respect of other parties’ Internet activities involving copyrighted cultural products. 47
The gist of the idea is to enact a regime similar to
Part VIII of the Copyright Act to apply to Internet activities. Legislative amendments would permit unlimited
non-commercial communications and reproductions. A
correlative levy would be imposed on ISPs, who would
presumably pass the costs to subscribers benefiting from
proposed new copyright exceptions. The regime would
apply to music, possibly also to movies and perhaps even
to other cultural products. 48

Strictly speaking, Tariff 22 would have applied to
everyone who communicated music online, including
both Web sites and ISPs. However, by arguing that ISPs
either telecommunicate as part of a chain of telecommunication, or authorize their customers to telecommunicate, SOCAN sought to collect copyright royalties at a
convenient checkpoint. 42 Practically, it is doubtful that
SOCAN would have been able to collect royalties from
the innumerable individual persons who communicate
music via the Internet. In other words, because of a
perceived inability to enforce copyright vis-à-vis individuals who transmit music via the Internet, Tariff 22
would have targeted third party proxies instead. 43 The
underlying concept is strikingly similar to Canada’s private copying levy.

The suggestion to adopt an exemption/levy model
for Internet transmissions resembles grander schemes
proposed by some American commentators. Professor
Netanel, for example, delineates a comprehensive model
that would permit private copying, remixes, adaptations,
modifications, and dissemination of all kinds of communicative expressions in both digital and non-digital
form. 49 To provide sufficient compensation to creators, a
levy would be imposed on a broad range of goods and
services the value of which is substantially enhanced by
peer-to-peer file sharing. Professor Ku also advocates for
levies on the sale of Internet services and electronic
equipment, but his model would apply to digital cultural
products only. 50 Professor Fisher proposes to allow
various uses of audio and video recordings in exchange
for a government reward system funded through taxation of digital recording and storage devices. 51 Professor
Lessig’s model is similar, but he considers it to be useful
only for a transitional period, until convenient music
streaming via the Internet makes file sharing obsolete. 52
Peter Eckersley, an Australian scholar, has similarly discussed the concept of a virtual market — a decentralized,
software-mediated, publicly funded mechanism to
reward digital authorship without restricting flows of
information. 53

When the Tariff 22 debate reached the Supreme
Court of Canada in the case of SOCAN v. CAIP, the

Although different in details, all of the aforementioned models are based on the same underlying idea —

A whole other scheme is needed to deal with the
telecommunication of digital music. Under the Copyright Act, these are distinct rights that are often held or
administered by different entities. ‘‘Tariff 22’’, a proposal
by the Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) to collect royalties from
anyone who communicates music to the public via the
Internet, had the potential to become such a scheme.
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dissemination of music and/or other pop culture should
be encouraged and the present copyright system is a
hindrance. Therefore, a new system is needed to generate financial incentives for creators. The solution is a
variant of compulsory licensing. Typically, however, the
licence fees are paid not by actual users but by thirdparty proxies, such as manufacturers of electronic hardware or software, or network providers and other
intermediaries.
It is important to distinguish these proposals from
ostensibly similar ideas discussed, for example, by Professor Gervais, 54 the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), 55 and others. 56 Professor Litman notes that there
are two models for collecting fees to be distributed
among creators: a direct blanket licensing fee and levy or
tax on the sale of goods or services. 57 Professor Gervais’
model, for example, essentially proposes user fees, which
are simply brokered by intermediaries and backed up by
enforceable exclusivity. This type of scheme would be
voluntary rather than compulsory. 58 Voluntary licensing
proposals, unlike exemption/levy schemes, are built on a
framework of exclusive proprietary copyrights. Professor
Gervais advocates for a system whereby copyright is used
to normatively coerce consumers into payment of
licensing fees, but is in practice rarely or never actually
litigated. Generally, Professors Gervais and Litman and
the EFF propose to build new business models upon
slight modifications to the existing paradigm.
Professor Merges has urged us to stick with the
three ‘‘golden oldies’’ — property rights, contracts and
markets. 59 Likewise, Professor Leibowitz has emphasized
that we should not ‘‘throw out the baby with the
bathwater’’ but should instead investigate more carefully
arguments surrounding a shift away from an unfettered
market. 60
In my opinion, copyright markets are far from perfect. Yet with some reorganization and streamlining,
copyrights can work to facilitate a thriving digital music
market in Canada. The market can give consumers who
wish to pay for access to cultural products the ability to
do so on clear and reasonable terms. Music can be sold
online à la carte, through licensed peer-to-peer smorgasbords and from traditional bricks-and-mortar retailers.
Despite the music industry’s imprudent delays 61 each of
these business models is already proving to be a viable
option built upon traditional proprietary copyrights.
The next step is to simplify market exchanges,
rather than undermine them through an expanded
exemption/levy scheme. It is not my purpose in this
paper to elaborate on particular suggestions for
reforming the existing system. Instead, the remainder of
the discussion is aimed at supporting the proposition
that a levy scheme is not the best way forward.
The relatively radical concept of substituting third
party liabilities for free-market transactions suffers from
numerous flaws. There are possible philosophical objections, constitutional constraints, international treaty

issues, cross-subsidization concerns and outdated
assumptions, all of which must be dealt with before a
broad exemption/levy scheme would be viable in
Canada. On balance, the downside of levies outweighs
any upside. In fact, all of the benefits that a levy would
generate can be obtained more fairly and efficiently by
other means.

Philosophical Objections
The philosophical justifications for granting copyrights to music creators fall into two broad categories. 62
One view treats legal protection as a means to the end of
greater creativity for the benefit of society generally.
Under this utilitarian rationale, copyrights are necessary
only to the extent they constitute an irreplaceable incentive to invest (effort or money) in the creation or dissemination of music. The other perspective perceives protection of creative work as a natural right simply formalized
by legal recognition.
Distinctions within the music industry are highly
relevant here. Authors and performers are living,
breathing persons who can at least purport to have natural rights of ownership in their creative output.
Whether or not their claim is convincing is debatable,
but at least, prima facie, it is credible. The same is not
true of producers and distributors, which, as unnatural
legal entities, cannot claim they naturally deserve proprietary protection for their work. If they are to lobby for
legal rights, the argument must rest on utilitarian
grounds. 63
For those who believe that human authors or performers have natural property rights in their work, an
exemption/levy model might seem difficult to accept.
On this view, it might be unacceptable for the state to
expropriate artists’ innate property rights by introducing
a mandatory licensing scheme. Professor Christie has
explained that:
A statutory licence and levy scheme may appear antithetical
to a copyright system in which the authors’ rights are paramount. . . . Put simply, a statutory licence and levy removes a
degree of control from the author. Such a scheme effectively
declares that a licence will be imposed, for which compensation is received by means of a levy, irrespective of authorial
consent. This appears contrary to one’s stereotype of the
principles underpinning European copyright law [that copyright is a natural entitlement of the author]. 64

Indeed, evidence shows that the Canadian music
industry was eager to obtain the levy, but reluctant to
accept the concomitant exemption. 65
Christie has offered a possible explanation for the
emergence of exemption/levy schemes in copyright systems that view authors’ rights as natural. Essentially,
levies represent a compromise solution that balances
authors’ rights to control their works with users’ rights to
privacy. 66 It has also been suggested that where a right to
remuneration is provided for, there exists no basis for
authorial control. 67 It is as if acknowledgment of the
obligation to remunerate satisfies the need for recogni-
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tion of authorship. This account of the legitimacy of
private copying levies has potential, but further study is
necessary to understand whether an expanded levy
system would be philosophically consistent with
Canada’s pluralistic copyright framework.
There is a more fundamental point, however: to the
extent that the philosophical underpinnings of Canadian
copyright law permit us to re-evaluate the current
system, we should abandon completely the idea of ex
post compensation based on consumer demand — that
is what markets do, and what markets do best. 68 When
discussing levies as alternatives to markets, the compensation label is misleading. Levy payments have nothing
to do with the use of any particular work, but reflect the
expropriation of all copyrights-holders’ ability to control
use on a macro level. From a policy perspective, levy
revenues are meant to offset the cumulative effect of
exempting a class of users from liability for infringement.
This should be contrasted with compensatory payments
on account of individual uses. Viewed properly, levies are
a form of subsidization, not compensation. Once this is
recognized and accepted, then there is no reason that the
economic incentives to create cultural products must
come after the product has been created. The compensation label is, therefore, also unnecessary because the purpose of the exercise would be to generate ex ante
‘‘inducements’’, not ex post ‘‘compensation’’. 69 Levies are
essentially a philosophical halfway point between a
market based on proprietary rights and a system of direct
or indirect public funding. Conceptually, this is very
awkward.

Constitutional Constraints
The Canadian Constitution limits Parliament’s
ability to enact any sort of cultural policy it wishes under
the auspices of the Copyright Act. I have dealt with this
issue in detail elsewhere. 70 Briefly put, the problem is as
follows. Parliament may enact laws in respect of ‘‘Copyrights’’, but the provinces control ‘‘Property and Civil
Rights’’. Of course, by following proper procedures, Parliament can also impose laws about ‘‘Taxation’’. But Parliament cannot just tax Internet access or personal computers, and by calling it ‘‘copyright’’ make it so, at least
not for constitutional purposes. This problem may not
be insurmountable in the United States, where the
Supreme Court seems to have given Congress considerable leeway to promote science and useful arts. 71 But
Australia’s exemption/levy scheme was struck down as
unconstitutional. 72 In Canada, levies are vulnerable to
attack on similar grounds.
The Federal Court of Appeal has recently affirmed
the constitutionality of Canada’s private copying levy. 73
However, the Court dealt with the ‘‘Copyrights’’ issue
only briefly, and seems to have ignored evidence of the
levy’s legal and practical effects. When one fully considers the broad legal and practical effects that flow from
the Board’s interpretation of ‘‘ordinarily used’’ as estab-
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lishing only a nominal threshold for imposing a levy on
blank media, the levy begins to look, in pith and substance, a lot like an unconstitutional regulation of ‘‘Property and Civil Rights’’. 74
Furthermore, in respect of the ‘‘Taxation’’ issue, the
Court suggested that the principle of federalism in
Canada and the existence of a prohibition on intergovernmental taxation in Canada’s Constitution were reasons to distinguish Australian case law. 75 However, the
technicalities of intergovernmental taxes are not relevant
to the determination of whether the levy is a ‘‘tax’’ or a
‘‘regulatory charge’’, 76 and regardless, the Australian Constitution is remarkably similar to ours in this respect,
indicating that perhaps the Court wrongly distinguished
the High Court’s decision. 77
Therefore, it is quite possible that a provincial appellate court or a differently constituted panel of the Federal
Court of Appeal would conclude that Canada’s existing
private copying levy is unconstitutional. Until the
Supreme Court expresses an opinion on the matter,
doubts will remain. It is certainly not safe to assume that
an even broader levy would be constitutionally valid.
The constitutional problems inherent in a levy on all
digital memory cards, personal computers or Internet
access may be insurmountable.

International Treaty Issues
An expanded exemption/levy scheme may also violate Canada’s international treaty obligations. 78 For
starters, any copyright exception must pass a three-step
test: it must be restricted to special cases, not conflict
with normal exploitation of the work, and must not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
rights-holder. A standalone exemption to cover some
types of private copying, without a concomitant levy, is
apparently acceptable. Time or format shifting under the
American doctrine of fair use is separate and apart from
that country’s compensation scheme for digital audio
home recording. 79 By contrast, the European Community’s Copyright Directive states that private copying
exemptions are only permitted on condition that rightsholders receive fair compensation, which would presumably require the introduction of a levy. 80 Some might
argue that a levy is necessary whenever the cumulative
effect of an exception is significant from a commercial
standpoint. 81 Yet this would seem to suggest that there
should be a levy for pretty much any exception, which
clearly there is not.
The more pertinent issue, however, is whether
attaching a levy to a broad exemption would successfully
repel a challenge based on the Berne/TRIPs three-step
test. Commentators are generally cautiously optimistic
that a levy scheme could be drafted to pass this test. 82
Eckersley, while arguing that it remains possible, illustrates the wider trepidation: ‘‘It is improbable that an
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alternative compensation camel could be squeezed
through the Article 13 eye of the TRIPs needle.’’ 83
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Further complications regarding a broad exemption/levy scheme in Canada arise in the context of
looming treaty obligations. As things now stand, one of
the primary advantages of the existing Canadian private
copying levy is that it disproportionately benefits Canadian, as opposed to foreign, creators. Consistent with
Canada’s obligations under Berne/TRIPs, the existing
levy scheme compensates both Canadian and foreign
authors of musical works. Foreign authors get ‘‘national
treatment’’ — they are treated no differently than Canadian authors. The same is not true for foreign performers
and producers. Only Canadian performers and producers are entitled to a share of the revenues collected
under Canada’s current levy scheme. Perhaps our favouritism will eventually backfire by undermining the system
of reciprocity at the heart of international copyright law,
but for the time being Canadian performers and producers are disproportionate beneficiaries of our lopsided
levy. From Canadians’ perspective, this is a good thing.
But Canada is a signatory to the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Ratification (or
possibly even ‘‘implementation’’) of this treaty might
have a serious impact on the distribution of levy revenues. 84 The WPPT requires national treatment for performers and producers. Were Canada to live up to these
obligations, it would significantly increase the number of
creators entitled to a share of levy revenues. This means a
smaller piece of the pie for Canadian creators, or a bigger
pie funded by Canadian consumers. Either way,
Canadians lose. As mentioned, net outflows could add
up to tens of millions of dollars. 85
The Standing Committee on Copyright Reform
asserted in its May 2004 Report that ‘‘the private copying
regime does not prevent Canada’s ratification of the
WPPT’’. 86 Strictly speaking that might be true, but questions about Canada’s ability to ratify this treaty are distinct from the distributional issues that may arise following ratification. Most recently, the March 2005
Government Statement on Proposals for Copyright
Reform reopened the question of the current system’s
validity under the WPPT. 87

Cross-Subsidization
Exemption/levy schemes entail the drawback of
cross-subsidization. This is a problem in two ways. First,
the higher the number and more variable the type of
rights-holders who become entitled to remuneration, the
more difficult it is to distribute levy revenues on a just
and timely basis. Indeed, simply determining what constitutes a just basis for distribution is problematic. Revenue generated on account of certain works ends up
subsidizing other works, because it is impossible to precisely correlate the collection and distribution of funds
to deserving (on whatever basis) rights-holders.
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Substantial delays are unavoidable. In fact, a
majority of the revenues generated under Canada’s private copying regime have not been distributed. The first
step of disbursing funds to the collectives representing
particular classes of rights-holders has been drawn-out,
and it is unclear whether any funds have ultimately
reached real Canadian artists yet. 88 The Copyright Board
has recognized that these delays are not the fault of the
umbrella collective responsible for administering the
levies. 89 They are instead an inherent problem with
levies generally. Unfortunately, specific data on this
matter may never emerge, as the Copyright Board has
little ability to monitor or supervise the distribution of
the levies. 90
Most proposals espouse a detailed tracking system
of one sort or another to address the issue of revenue
distribution. Such systems may be feasible in the long
term, but uniform implementation will require tremendous co-ordination and commitment. Moreover,
detailed tracking systems may undermine any privacy
gains made by substituting exclusive copyrights with an
exemption/levy scheme.
A second, more problematic, type of cross-subsidization is external. Exemption/levy schemes put the onus
on innovative technology and communications enterprises to subsidize the music industry. One might argue
this is justified on three possible grounds — causation,
enrichment or convenience. However, it is much too
simplistic to suggest that suppliers of blank media or
Internet connectivity, for example, cause private copying.
The argument that third parties are profiting directly or
indirectly from private copying is also not a sufficient
reason to impose a levy on their goods or services. Nor is
simple convenience.
Causation, enrichment and convenience have never
been organizing principles in copyright law. As Professors Lemley and Reese have recently put it:
‘‘Unrestricted liability for anyone who is in any way
involved with such copyright infringement is a bad
idea. ’’ 9 1 Nevertheless, American and Australian
lawmakers have begun to impose copyright liability for
secondary, tertiary or quaternary infringement. 92 Canada
has, thus far, resisted such pressures. An expanded
exemption/levy scheme targeting third party proxies
would represent a dramatic shift in Canadian law and
policy.
Indeed, imposing a burden on third party providers
of goods or services for such reasons would run contrary
to fundamental principles established in the context of
contributory liability, such as MGM v. Grokster 93 and
Sony-Betamax 94 in the United States, and CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada 95 in
Canada. The latest word from the United States
Supreme Court is that contributory liability may be
attributed to ‘‘one who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
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shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement . . .’’. 96 The rule ‘‘premises
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct’’. 97 Very few, if any, third parties whose goods or
services would be levied under the typical exemption/levy proposals could be characterized in this way.
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The Federal Court of Australia recently decided that
the promoters of the Kazaa peer-to-peer file sharing
system were legally responsible for authorizing copyright
infringements. 98 But the Chief Justice of Canada, writing
for a unanimous Supreme Court, explicitly rejected the
principles of Australian law upon which that decision
was based: ‘‘The [Australian] approach to authorization
shifts the balance in copyright too far in favour of the
owner’s rights and unnecessarily interferes with the
proper use of copyrighted works for the good of society
as a whole.’’ 99
Simply providing the means to facilitate, or benefiting from copyright infringement is not itself objectionable in Canada. Even if a blank media manufacturer or
ISP could be said to authorize the copying or communication of music, courts must presume they do so only so
far as it is in accordance with the law. 100 To be held
liable based on conventional principles of Canadian copyright law, the alleged authorizer must have a degree of
control over the actions of actual copyright infringers. 101
Because providers of would-be levied goods and services
usually do not control the actions of their customers, an
obligation to remit payments to copyright holders on
account of their customers’ use of music runs contrary to
the basic tenets of Canadian copyright law and policy.
It might be suggested that third party targets of
levies actually benefit from the existence of exemption/levy schemes. The argument that legalizing private
copying increases sales of copying hardware and software
is difficult to refute or verify. 102 It assumes first that legalizing an activity will make it more prevalent. Peer-to-peer
activities, however, may be influenced more by social
than legal norms. 103 Second, it assumes that music copying and blank media are complementary, so that if the
cost of copying music (in terms of legal risk and/or social
stigma) declines, demand for blank media will rise. This
is probably true, but more information is needed to
determine whether this increase will be sufficient to
offset the decreased demand attributable to higher
prices. If demand were inelastic, an exemption/levy
might have little effect. 104 But one cannot generalize
about the range of products that might be levied. Furthermore, even if there were some financial benefit to
these third parties, levies entail a substantial administrative burden. Technology and communications firms are
simply not in the business of collecting, accounting for
and remitting levies, nor should they be.
The net effect of levies on providers of levied goods
and services is unlikely to be positive. Most people take
for granted that costs are eventually passed on to end
consumers. But again, that assumption is difficult to
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verify. And if costs were in fact passed on to consumers,
the net financial effect would again depend on the price
elasticity of demand for levied products. Higher prices
for blank media, iPods, personal computers or Internet
access may result in lower demand, ultimately causing a
loss of revenues. Levies can also result in significant
market distortions by encouraging grey or black markets
for levied products. This is a serious and real concern for
all parties affected by Canada’s existing private copying
levy. 105
Fundamentally, the argument that the burden of
levies is probably passed from providers of goods and
services to consumers does not resolve the issue of crosssubsidization. The higher up the chain one goes, the less
accurate the charge becomes. In respect of the private
copying levy, the Federal Court of Appeal has acknowledged that: ‘‘Such a scheme cannot be perfect; it is a
rough estimate, involving possible overcharging of some
and undercharging of others.’’ 106 Although some users of
the product or service in question — blank media, personal computers or Internet access — will engage in the
copying or communication activities at the root of the
scheme, a great number of others will not.
Take the following concrete example. All blank CDs
manufactured in or imported to Canada are subject to a
levy to compensate for the fact that some blank CDs are
used for copying music. The Copyright Board found that
‘‘between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of individual
consumers who buy blank CDs do so in some measure
for the specific purpose of copying pre-recorded music.
Moreover, it appears that over 40 per cent of individuals
use recordable CDs for no other purpose’’. However, the
highest estimates suggest that of all blank CDs bought in
Canada, the proportion of blank CDs used by consumers
to copy music (as compared to those used by businesses,
or for copying data or photographs, for example) is
roughly one third. 107 The levy rate is discounted to
reflect this fact, but the point remains that purchasers of
two thirds of all blank CDs subsidize the few consumers
who use these media heavily for copying music. Simply
put, the levy has a much larger effect on persons who do
not engage in private copying than on persons who do.
The over-breadth of Canada’s private copying levy is
more than just an unfortunate side effect for
technophiles. It is a very serious issue for thousands of
Canadian manufacturers, retailers and commercial purchasers of goods and services that are or would be levied.
For example, imagine the effect that a levy on Internet
access would have on e-commerce or educational uses of
the Web. If the Government were to extend the levy to
digital memory generally, without amending the
meaning of ‘‘ordinarily’’ as interpreted by the Board, the
same problem might arise in respect of memory cards,
personal computers, mobile telephones, personal digital
assistants or a range of other digital devices. Remember,
the iPod is also a personal agenda, portable data storage
device, digital photo album, and now even a mobile
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phone and video player. There is no way to distinguish
customers who fill these devices with music from those
who do other things. As technological advances lead to
increasing product convergence, this problem will only
be exacerbated.
Moreover, consumers of these media may pay for
the same activity two or even three times over. For
example, someone who purchases a song from Apple’s
iTunes Music Store contractually acquires the right to
make certain private copies of the track. They are
expressly entitled to ‘‘burn and export’’ tracks ‘‘for personal, non-commercial use’’. 108 Yet this consumer would
pay again for the same activity through the private copying levy on blank CDs. Furthermore, there is a possibility this consumer could still be sued for copyright
infringement if, for example, the burning process
involved making a copy on a personal computer.
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Double-dipping in this manner is likely to cause
resentment amongst consumers. This may ultimately
jeopardize the viability of the levy scheme. Worse, consumer hostility toward industry tactics could actually
undermine the implementation of creative new business
models.
Unfairness might be alleviated through carefully tailored exceptions, which can in theory turn levies from
blunt instruments into precise tools. However, separating
the wheat from the chaff is not easy. If Canada’s current
private copying regime is any indication, things do not
bode well for a potential levy on digital memory or
Internet access. The Federal Court of Appeal, affirming
the Copyright Board of Canada on this point, recently
noted that Part VIII of the Copyright Act contains no
legitimate exemptions for the vast numbers of consumers and, more importantly, businesses, who purchase
blank media for purposes other than private copying. 109
The Court agreed with the Board’s insights that there are
fundamental problems with the ad hoc waiver program
that has developed, because it is administered unilaterally by the beneficiaries of the levy. 110 At a minimum,
therefore, the Board ought to be given express jurisdiction to monitor an exemption scheme as part of any
would-be broader levy.
Insofar as a levy is necessary or desirable, a more
precise alternative might be to impose the charge at the
source, not the destination, of copies of cultural products.
This suggestion is not entirely without precedent. For
example, the French film industry is supported in part by
a levy on cinema tickets. 111 In the context of music, one
option is to levy pre-recorded CDs and paid downloads,
from which all copies ultimately originate.
Some might argue that, in fact, private copying is
already factored into the price of music at the point of
sale. Certainly, this is explicitly acknowledged with
authorized downloads that include the right to make
copies. It is also implicitly the case with copy-protected
CDs that allow consumers to make copies in some ways
but not others.

In principle, a levy on pre-recorded music might
focus the burden of levies more precisely on the activities
that justify their existence. First, the groups intended to
benefit could collect the levies directly. Administrative,
opportunity and other transaction costs that are currently imposed on manufacturers, importers, distributors
and retailers of levied products could be reduced or
eliminated. Second, it would insulate non-copiers from
any effect of the levies. The burdens would fall instead
only on those who consume music. By building the
value of private copying into the source of music, a levy
on CDs and downloads could be calculated to account
for all spin-off copies that might eventually be made
from that original source. Although there could be free
trade issues to work around, such a levy might even be
structured so as to favour Canadian creators over foreigners by reducing or eliminating the levy payable on
sales of Canadian music.
One may argue that a levy on pre-recorded music
would exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problems
faced by authorized music distributors. The primary
objection would be that increasing the price of music by
adding a levy might drive even more consumers to
obtain music from unauthorized sources. Yet, blank
media manufacturers and importers could easily cite
similar fears in respect of the market for their products. It
seems unfair that technology and communications firms
should bear a burden that the music industry itself
would be unwilling to accept. Even if a levy on prerecorded music is not ultimately a viable alternative,
merely raising the idea forces us to consider why a levy
on third-party proxy goods and services would be more
acceptable. When all of the cross-subsidization issues are
illuminated, this question becomes difficult or impossible to answer.

Outdated Assumptions
From Copyright Holders’ Perspective
Perhaps the most basic reason not to adopt a
broader exemption/levy scheme in Canada is that the
need has never been convincingly demonstrated. And
even if there was such a need in the past, fundamental
legal and technological changes have occurred that call
into to question the primary rationale for levies — that
proprietary copyrights are practically unenforceable. The
assumptions that were thought to underlie Canada’s
existing private copying regime are no longer applicable.
On one hand, technological measures (commonly
called TPMs) give creators an unprecedented ability to
control consumers’ use of digital music. All music sold
online, and many new CD releases contain copy-protection measures. Such measures may dictate, for example,
how many copies consumers can make or which sorts of
devices can be copied to. One of the most thorough
studies on this issue to date has concluded that levies
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should be phased out as these tools become available to
control private copying activities. 112
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It is true that no technology is entirely unassailable,
but in fact, technological measures are typically criticized
for being too effective. Most commentators who have
looked at this issue have confirmed that Canadians need
protection from these technologies, although some disagree. 113 Because technological measures can help to
create viable new business models for the music
industry, such measures should probably not be prohibited outright. Some form of regulation, however, is warranted to safeguard consumers’ rights and protect
Canadians’ privacy.
Recent lawsuits around the globe provide further
evidence that exemption/levy schemes are unwarranted.
Although it is impossible to sue every alleged infringer, it
is unnecessary to do so. Laws are most effective when
operating in the background, influencing social norms
and facilitating the voluntary exchange of rights and
obligations. As Professor Gervais points out, the
recording industry’s problem with peer-to-peer networks
is not the impracticability of licensing the activity but
the difficulty of influencing social norms surrounding
this technology. 114 Of course, lawsuits are not the firstbest solution to the industry’s woes. But the concern is
more about public relations than logistics.
It should be noted that the Copyright Board and
the Government have implicitly recognized that technological and legal developments have undermined conventional assumptions about private copying, and subtly
indicated an intention to phase out Canada’s existing
private copying levy. 115
The formula adopted by the Board for setting the
levy rate contains a calculation recognizing that technological measures allow some consumers to pay directly
for private copying rights. 116 As this practice becomes
more widespread, the Board may be willing to reduce
levy rates accordingly, perhaps eventually approaching
zero. To be clear, however, there is no guarantee that this
will happen.
If Bill C-60 becomes law, it would not allow the
circumvention of technological measures for the purpose
of private copying, although circumventing for other
non-infringing purposes would be permitted. 117 This reservation — that one cannot circumvent to copy for private use — is somewhat mysterious. It prohibits consumers from making private copies, even though they
have paid for the right to do so through the levy. In
effect, this would allow the music industry to be remunerated for copies that individuals cannot make. The
only possible explanation is that the government is
depending on the Copyright Board to factor this into
consideration when setting the levy rate. If that is the
case, the Government would be wise to say so. The
European Community’s Copyright Directive expressly
references the need for levies to take ‘‘account of the
application or non-application of technological mea-
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sures’’. 118 Note, however, that a general discount in the
levy rate would avoid supplying a windfall to music
creators, but would do nothing to address the crosssubsidization concerns discussed above.
In general it seems as if the Government, through
Bill C-60, has created a hierarchy whereby protection for
technological measures is more important than the conceptual or practical integrity of the private copying
scheme. In doing so, it has apparently expressed a preference for technological measures over private copying
levies as a solution to some of the problems of the digital
music market. But the ambiguity in respect of the Canadian Government’s intention highlights the urgent need
for study and comprehensive legislative reform in this
area. Unfortunately, the Government has decided to
evaluate these two fundamentally related matters separately, prematurely dealing with technological measures
and/or unduly delaying private copying issues. Provisions
addressing technological measures in Bill C-60 should
not be adopted into law until this issue is sorted out, or
at least until the Government is clear about its intentions.
In sum, by choosing to embrace technological protection measures and sue music consumers, the industry
may have precluded itself from arguing that levies are a
necessary response to the impossibility or impracticality
of enforcing its copyrights.
From Copyright Users’ Perspective
For many consumers who are proponents of
exemption/levy schemes, the attractiveness lies mainly in
the exemption aspect of the quid pro quo. Some have an
ideological hostility toward copyright generally. Others
might simply be concerned about the potential for abuse
inherent in statutory monopolies, privacy issues, market
efficiency or the siphoning of copyright royalties to foreign corporations. It is tempting to conclude that an
exemption/levy model is capable of addressing such concerns, while at the same time recognizing the value of
music and supporting the Canadian industry. On a
closer look, however, it would seem that an exemption
that covers the normal activities of most digital music
consumers is either (a) unnecessary, or (b) unrealistic.
From the consumer’s perspective, the assumption
that a specific exemption/levy for private copying and
other non-commercial activities is necessary may be outdated. Time or format shifting, archiving backups and
personalizing compilations are all possibly examples of
‘‘fair use’’ in the United States. 119 In Australia, on the
other hand, it seems that these activities are not permitted despite the fact that everybody is doing it. 120 This
has led one copyright expert to remark: ‘‘Australian law
is an ass.’’ 121 The House of Lords would apparently agree:
From the point of view of society the present position is
lamentable. Millions of breaches of the law must be committed by home copiers every year. Some home copiers may
break the law in ignorance, despite extensive publicity and
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warning notices on records, tapes and films. Some home
copiers may break the law because they estimate that the
chances of detection are non-existent. Some home copiers
may consider that the entertainment and recording industry
already exhibit all the characteristics of undesirable
monopoly — lavish expenses, extravagant earnings and
exorbitant profits — and that the blank tape is the only
restraint on further increases in the prices of records.
Whatever the reason for home copying, the beat of Sergeant
Pepper and the soaring sounds of the Miserere from
unlawful copies are more powerful than law-abiding
instincts or twinges of conscience. A law which is treated
with such contempt should be amended or repealed. 122

In Australia, a review is underway to determine what to
do about the issue. 123
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It is not clear whether Canadian law needs fixing to
solve this particular problem. A decade ago, when
Canada’s private copying levy was introduced, courts and
legislators seemed convinced that copyright was an
instrument for the benefit of creators alone. The weight
of opinion at that time was that distinctions between the
American concept of ‘‘fair use’’ and the Canadian law of
‘‘fair dealing’’ meant private copying was clearly illegal in
Canada.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has issued a
series of landmark decisions, all of which emphatically
endorsed the notion of balance in copyright law. 124 A
credible argument can now be made that many private
non-commercial uses of music are ‘‘fair dealing’’ in
Canada. This would render the private copying exemption in section 80 of the Copyright Act redundant in
some cases, 125 and call into question the value of a
broader exemption/levy scheme for consumers.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously agreed
that systematic for-profit legal research carried out by
tens of thousands of Ontario lawyers is fair dealing. 126 An
individual’s downloading activities for the purpose of
consumer research, to evaluate a potential music
purchase for example, would seem far less objectionable
than that. Given the speculative nature of the fair dealing
defence generally, the argument is difficult to apply prospectively en masse, but could certainly succeed in a
bona fide case with a proper factual and evidentiary
basis. This might require, for example, an affidavit as to
the consumer’s copying habits and intentions, or reference to some of the empirical data suggesting a positive
correlation, if any, between downloading and music
sales. 127
The Supreme Court also sanctioned the Great
Library’s telecommunication of works to persons who
are fair dealing as an integral part of the research process. 128 Although an analogy to posting music on the
Internet is inexact, the implications of the Supreme
Court’s ruling for more limited types of uploading has
yet to be explored.
It is also unclear how ‘‘private study’’ might be interpreted following the Supreme Court’s ruling. It would
make sense for a court to put heavy emphasis on the
adjective ‘‘private’’ and adopt ‘‘a large and liberal inter-
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pretation’’ 129 of ‘‘study’’ — one that does not overlap
with ‘‘research’’. A plain language interpretation of
‘‘study’’ might, therefore, include copying to watch or
listen to (i.e., study) copyrighted content in private as fair
dealing. This could conceivably cover time or format
shifting, especially in light of the factors outlined by the
Supreme Court for determining what is ‘‘fair’’. 130 The
basic point is that the CCH v. LSUC decision seriously
challenges conventional assumptions about the need for,
and value of, exemptions offered to consumers in
exchange for third party levies.
Regardless, aside from a possible fair dealing argument, the potential upside for consumers under an
exemption/levy scheme is more apparent than real. The
reason, in short, is that it is politically, economically and
legislatively unrealistic to obtain all of the exemptions
necessary to share digital music online.
For example, the private copying exemption in section 80 applies to a narrow genre of truly private copying
onto certain types of media. Consumers wishing to exercise their putative rights may be caught infringing copyright for a number of incidental activities. As mentioned,
a consumer who burns a song to a blank CD using a
personal computer may well have made multiple permanent or ephemeral reproductions onto a personal computer — as things now stand, a device that is not an
‘‘audio recording medium’’. 131 Even if expanded to cover
iPods and personal computers, the private copying levy
could conceivably apply to music downloading, but
uploading is another matter. Uploading implicates telecommunication rights, which are typically owned and
administered by distinct entities. It may implicate distribution or other rights as well, which would add another
layer of nearly insurmountable complexity. A right to
download would soon be fairly useless without a corresponding right for others to upload. And even supposing
that an exemption/levy scheme of this sort were feasible,
it would still apply only to uploading and downloading
of music. Those consumers wishing to share or privately
copy other products, such as movies, books or software,
would be required to clear all necessary rights in the
traditional manner.
For an exemption/levy scheme to succeed, fundamental and wholesale changes in the existing copyright
system would be necessary. It is a mistake, therefore, for
consumers to believe that a levy is a realistic trade-off for
anything more than a narrowly tailored exemption for a
limited class of activities, which may already be permitted. Exemption/levy proposals tend to divert attention from the more moderate possibilities. For user-rights
advocates who would like to see meaningful changes in
their lifetimes, efforts would be better spent promoting a
shift from a categorical list of acceptable activities to an
open-ended and principled right of fair dealing, 132 coupled with proposals for streamlined voluntary collective
licensing models. Prospects for success on that front are
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much greater than arguing for a comprehensive exemption/levy scheme to satisfy consumers’ needs.
To sum up, various assumptions about the need for
levies are outdated. From copyrights-holders’ perspective,
the music industry has clearly demonstrated that there
are both technological and legal means to create functional business models to address online uses of digital
music. From consumers’ perspective, an exemption to
address the types of activities typically engaged in is
either unnecessary or unrealistic.

Other Alternatives to Copyrights
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evies spread the burden of funding the music
industry amongst technology and communications
firms and their customers rather than the public at large.
But recall the classic utilitarian argument in favour of
copyright, that copyrights encourage the production of
cultural products like music for the good of society as a
whole. If it is true that society as a whole reaps the
benefit of a healthy and vibrant Canadian music
industry, it would seem fair that society as a whole, not
just a particular economic or sector or group of consumers, contribute to such a goal.
Grant and Wood describe a ‘‘toolkit’’ that governments can use to support popular culture, including
funding for public broadcasting, scheduling or expenditure requirements for private broadcasters, subsidies or
tax incentives, foreign-ownership rules and competition
policy measures. 133 The Canada Music Fund, for
example, assists the Canadian music industry through
various initiatives supporting songwriting, composing,
new musical works, specialized music, market development, sound recording entrepreneurship and the preservation of Canadian music collections. Canada’s music
industry can be encouraged through increased education
and training in the music sector, or by formal or
informal recognition and awards for artists.
Also, public funding programs need not focus exclusively on the creation of cultural products, but should
actively support dissemination as well. 134 In other words,
emphasis should be placed on supply-side and demandside cultural subsidies. Consumers should be encouraged
to choose Canadian music, and be rewarded for doing
so.
Funding public support programs for cultural industries is sometimes difficult and controversial. 135 One
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problem is establishing selection criteria, such as potential or past performance, subjective merit or some other
measure. Also there is the risk that public funding programs can constrain freedom of expression and lead to
state control over culture. But, as long as one is not
advocating a centrally planned welfare scheme for artists
and cultural entrepreneurs, where the Department of
Canadian Heritage becomes our cultural soup kitchen,
such concerns are largely illusory. 136
Empirical evidence shows that public funding in
regional cultural industries pays off, by encouraging a
thriving cultural community, and in terms of spin-off
economic activities. 137 Data also shows that public
funding programs are inherently more efficient than a
levy scheme when it comes to generating and distributing revenue to cultural creators. The average
expense/revenue ratio for the Canada Music Fund is
about 11%. 138 The Canadian Private Copying Collective
(CPCC), an umbrella organization responsible for
administering Canada’s private copying levy, most
recently reported a ratio of 15%. 139 I am not suggesting
that the whole system of collectively administered copyrights could or should be replaced by the Canada Music
Fund. But the numbers demonstrate that levies are a
relatively inefficient method of supporting Canadian
music. Government programs can and should complement a streamlined system of collective administration.

Conclusion

E

xemption/levy schemes are conceptually and practically awkward, may be beyond the constitutional
legislative competence of the federal government, and
may violate Canada’s international treaty obligations.
There is no principled reason to impose the burden of
levies on third parties in the technology and communications industries. Such shotgun approaches, which
splatter liability around with the hope that some of the
intended targets will be hit, may cause unacceptable collateral damage in the war on putative piracy. Contrary to
traditional assumptions, exemption/levy schemes are
unnecessary given current technological, legal and
market conditions in Canada. Where necessary and
appropriate, traditional market mechanisms can be supplemented by public funding programs targeted at specific artists or activities in the music industry.
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Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336.

95

125

CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R.
339 [CCH v LSUC].

96

Grokster, supra note 93 at 19.

The Supreme Court held that reference to specific exemptions is unnecessary if an activity falls within the more general fair dealing provisions:
see CCH v. LSUC, supra, note 95 at para. 49. The Copyright Board, in
contrast, held that the section 80 exemption for private copying relegates the general fair dealing exemption to a second-order enquiry. At
worst, therefore, if the section 80 exemption does not apply (because, for
example, the medium is not an ‘‘audio recording medium’’), the fair
dealing provisions may be engaged.

126

Ibid.

127

See, for example, Mark N. Cooper, ‘‘Time for the Recording Industry to
Face the Music: The Political, Social and Economic Benefits of Peer-toPeer Communications Networks’’ (Stanford: Stanford Law School
Center For Internet And Society, 2005); Owen Gibson, ‘‘Online file
sharers ‘buy more music’’’, The Guardian (27 July, 2005), online: http://
technology.guardian.co.uk/online/news/0,12597,1536888,00.html;
Michael Geist, ‘‘Piercing the peer to peer myths: An examination of the
Canadian experience’’ (2005) 10:4 First Monday, online: http://
firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_4/geist/index.html; Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Working Party on the Information Economy, ‘‘Digital Broadband Content: Music’’ (Paris: O.E.C.D.,
2005); Felix Oberholzer and Koleman Strumpf, ‘‘The Effect of File
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis’’ (Harvard: Harvard
University & University of North Carolina, 2004), http://www.unc.edu/
~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf; Tatsuo Tanaka, ‘‘Does file
sharing reduce music CD sales? A case of Japan’’ (Tokyo: Institute of
Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University, 2004). But compare
Liebowitz, supra note 3.

128

CCH v. LSUC, supra note 95 at para. 69.

97

Ibid.

98

Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd,
[2005] FCA 1242.

99

CCH v. LSUC, supra note 95 at para. 41.

100

Ibid. at para. 38.

101

Ibid.

102

CPCC v. CSMA, supra note 4 at paras. 68–70; Private Copying
1999-2000, supra note 32 at 16. See also Fisher, supra note 3 at 4, 41.

103

Gervais, supra note 3.

104

See Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 32 at 37-38; Private Copying
2001-2002, supra note 32 at 4–6; Private Copying 2003-2004, supra note
4 at 58-59.

105

Private Copying 1999-2000, supra note 32 at 58.

106

Canada’s private copying regime was described as such by the Federal
Court of Appeal in AVS Technologies, supra note 34 at para. 7.

107

The data is insanely confusing, because there are different proportions to
consider (including ‘‘consumer vs. business purchasers’’ and within that
‘‘music vs. non-music uses’’) and different statistics for different formats,
not to mention conflicting evidence on the accuracy of different figures
submitted by different parties. See Private Copying 2003-2004, supra
note 4.

108

See ‘‘Terms of Sale’’, online: http://www.apple.com/ca/support/itunes/
legal/policies.html.

129

Ibid. at para. 51.

130

Ibid. at para. 53.

109

CPCC v. CSMA, supra note 4 at paras. 118–126.

110

131

Private Copying 2003-04, supra note 4.

CPCC v. CSMA, supra note 4.

111

132

See generally Jean-Marie Le Breton, The Film Industry in Britain and
France — Strategies for Success (2000) Franco-British Council, online:
http://www.francobritishcouncil.org.uk/filmindustry.htm; and Grant &
Wood, ibid. at 298-99 at sources cited therein.

See Carys Craig, ‘‘The Changing Face of Fair Dealing in Canadian
Copyright Law: A proposal for legislative reform’’ in Michael Geist, ed,
In the Public Interest: The Future of Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2005), c. 15.

112

See Hugenholtz, supra note 3; and N. Helberger ‘‘It’s not a right, silly!
The private copying exception in practice’’ INDICARE Monitor (7
October, 2004).

133

Grant & Wood, supra note 7 at 5.

134

See Allan Gregg, ‘‘Art for Everyone: Stop funding elitist culture and
support ventures that unite us’’ Maclean’s 116:21 (26 May, 2003) 40; and
Van der Ploeg, supra note 9.

135

Grant & Wood, supra note 7 at 304–306.

136

Grant & Wood, supra note 7 at 293.

137

‘‘In 2001-2002, cultural spending by all three levels of government in
Atlantic Canada totalled $446.2 million, 49 per cent of it from Ottawa.
But study author Nicole Barrieau, a researcher with the Universite de
Moncton, said the industry generated $2.1 billion in economic activity
— 3.1 per cent of the region’s GDP — and created more than 34,000

113

See Ian R. Kerr, Alana Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, ‘‘Technological
Protection Measures: Tilting at Copyright’s Windmill’’ (2002-2003) 34
Ottawa L.R. 7 and the sources cited therein. Compare Barry Sookman,
‘‘‘TPMs’: A Perfect Storm for Consumers: Replies to Professor Geist’’
(2005) 4:1 C.J.L.T. 23.

114

Gervais, supra note 3.

115

Note that the gradual phasing-out of levies contradicts the recommendation of Professor Hugenholtz. He suggests that levies should be elimi-

168

✄ REMOVE

Username: Shirley.Spalding

Date: 20-DEC-05

Time: 16:31

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\04_03\DebeerNov2005.dat

Seq: 16

jobs.’’ See Stephen Bomais, ‘‘Culture industry gives more than it gets,
study finds’’ Daily News Halifax (20 November, 2004) 21.
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See ‘‘Canada Music Fund Annual Report 2002-2003’’, online: http://
www.canadamusiccouncil.ca/en/about/pdf/Annual_Report_CMF.pdf.
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See ‘‘Financial Highlights’’, Canadian Private Copying Collective, online:
http://cpcc.ca/english/finHighlights.htm. By comparison, SOCAN had
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an expense/revenue ratio at 20% in 2002. See Statement of Operations
Chart, SOCAN, online: https://www.socan.ca/jsp/en/word_music/
FinRep03.jsp#s1.

